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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-REFERENCES
TO APPELLATE REVIEW IN CAPITAL
SENTENCING DETERMINATIONS
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
I. BACKGROUND
In Caldwell v. Mississippi 1 the Supreme Court held that a capital
sentence is invalid if a jury imposed it after a prosecutor told the
jury that the ultimate responsibility for determining the appropri-
ateness of the sentence rested with an appellate court and not with
thejury.2 Caldwell is thus an important chapter in the Court's eighth
amendment jurisprudence because it provides guidance to the
courts and the criminal bar as to the scope of information regarding
appellate review which may be provided to a jury.
"The Eighth Amendment stands to assure that the State's
power to punish is exercised within the limits of civilized stan-
dards."3 In recognition of this principle, the Supreme Court, in
Furman v. Georgia,4 held that discretionary sentencing, unguided by
legislatively defined standards, violated the eighth amendment. In
Furman, the Court reasoned that such sentencing was "pregnant
with discrimination," 5 because it permitted the death penalty to be
"wantonly" and "freakishly" imposed,6 and because it imposed the
death penalty with "great infrequency" and afforded "no meaning-
ful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it [was] imposed
from the many cases in which it [was] not."'7
Since Furman, however, the Court has not determined precisely
which factors a sentencer should focus on and the scope of the in-
formation with which the sentencer should be provided when mak-
ing a constitutionally proper sentencing determination.8
1 105 S. Ct. 2633 (1985).
2 Id. at 2636.
3 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (quoting Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
5 Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 313 (White, J, concurring).
8 As Justice Rehnquist observed in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 629 (1978)
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Four years after Furman, the Court suggested that the concerns
it expressed in that case could be met by giving the sentencing au-
thority "adequate information and guidance."9 The goal of this gui-
dance, the Court explained, is to focus the attention of the
sentencing authority on the particularized circumstances of the
crime and the defendant.' 0 The Court indicated that, with the ex-
ception of prejudicial evidence, the sentencer should have before it
as much information as possible when making the sentencing deci-
sion." Under the sentencing procedures approved by the Court in
Gregg v. Georgia, the sentencer must find at least one statutory aggra-
vating circumstance' 2 in order for the defendant to be eligible for
the death penalty.' 3 Once such eligibility is established, however,
the sentencer is free to consider any factor it deems relevant in de-
ciding which of the defendants eligible for capital punishment will
actually be sentenced to death.' 4 Thus, the sentencer's discretion
after Gregg remained as "unbridled" as the discretion that the Court
condemned in Furman. All the Georgia legislature had done to cor-
rect its sentencing procedure was to narrow somewhat the class of
individuals on whom the death penalty could be imposed.' 5 It is
(Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court "has... surely not
cloven to a principled doctrine either holding the infliction of the death penalty to be
unconstitutional per se or clearly and understandably stating the terms under which the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit the death penalty to be imposed .... [It]
has gone from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable predictability
upon which legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts must of necessity rely has been
all but completely sacrificed."
9 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
10 Id. at 206. See also Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 258 (1976);Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 271 (1976).
1" Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203-04.
12 In order to meet the requirements of Furman, most states have specified that the
jury must find certain factors to be present before a defendant is eligible for the death
penalty. See e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (Vernon 1974); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 37.071 (Vernon 1975).
13 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
14 Id.
15 The constitutionality of the Georgia sentencing procedure as a whole was reaf-
firmed by the Court in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and again in Zant v.
Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983). In Stephens, the Court conceded that it had approved the
sentencing procedure in Gregg, "even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discre-
tion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances." Id. at 875. This apparent inconsistency with the princi-
ples enunciated in Furman was sharply criticized by Justice Marshall in his dissenting
opinion in Stephens. Id. at 910-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A sentencing scheme similar to Georgia's was approved in California v. Ramos, 463
U.S. 992, 1008 (1983) ("Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legisla-
tively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty ... [it] then is free to




therefore not clear how a reviewing court may discern a "meaning-
ful basis for distinguishing"'16 between cases in which the death pen-
alty has and has not been imposed.
The Court again failed to formulate a means of distinguishing
death penalty cases from non-death penalty cases in Woodson v. North
Carolina.17 The Woodson Court acknowledged that Furman required
courts to use "objective standards to guide [and] regularize ... the
process for imposing a sentence of death."' 8 Yet, the Court also
wrote that "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the
character and record of each convicted defendant" is constitution-
ally required in the sentencing procedure. 19 It is difficult to recon-
cile Furman's call for objective standards to assure consistency in
capital sentencing with Woodson's mandate for a broad, subjective,
individualized inquiry.2
0
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio,21 the Court moved even fur-
ther away from Furman, by establishing as a constitutional principle
that a sentencer must be allowed to consider as a mitigating factor
"any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the cir-
cumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a
sentence less than death."
'22
16 Furman, 408 U.S. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
'7 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
18 Id. at 303.
19 Id. See also, id. at 304 ("A process that accords no significance to relevant facets of
the character and record of the individual offender or the circumstances of the particular
offense excludes from consideration in fixing the ultimate punishment of death the pos-
sibility of compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of
humankind.").
20 In fact, at least one commentator has suggested that any attempt to satisfy both
Furman and Woodson will only prove the inevitable incompetence of humans to adminis-
ter a constitutional death penalty. Geimer, Death at Any Cost: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Recent Retreat from Its Death Penalty Standards, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 737, 742
(1985).
21 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
22 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. See also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). It
should be noted that, even under Lockett, irrelevant factors may still be excluded from
the sentencer's consideration. 438 U.S. at 604 n.12. Since Lockett, the Court has contin-
ued to emphasize the broad, subjective standard established in Woodson. For example, in
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983), the Court noted the desirability of allowing
the sentencer to bring its own personal experiences to bear in making its decision. (The
trial judge in Barclay had referred to his experiences with World War II concentration
camps as helpful in assessing the magnitude of the crime at issue. Id. at 948 n.6.) In
fact, the Court explicitly approved of sentencers exercising discretion "in their own
way," although it added that such discretion must be guided in "a constitutionally ade-
quate way." Id. at 950. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983) (allowed testi-
mony from psychiatrists who, though they had not examined defendant, testified, based
on hypothetical questions, as to defendant's future dangerousness), the Court declared
that "the jury should be presented with all of the relevant information." See also id. at
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In his concurring opinion in Lockett, Justice Marshall described
the dilemma with which the Court has struggled since Furman as
"[a] chieving the proper balance between clear guidelines that assure
relative equality of treatment, and discretion to consider individual
factors whose weight cannot always be preassigned. ' 23 Although
Justice Marshall admitted that this is "no easy task," he went on to
write that "[w]here life itself ... hangs in the balance, a fine preci-
sion in the process must be insisted upon."'24
Although the members of the Court have not agreed as to the
scope of discretion to be afforded the jury in capital cases, it is clear
that all agree that, in general, the goal is to avoid the imposition of
the death penalty in an "arbitrary and capricious manner." 25
Perfection in capital sentencing procedures may be unobtainable,
26
but the Court wants "to insure that every safeguard is observed."
27
Because there is a difference between death and other forms of pun-
ishment, the Court has stressed the "need for reliability" in capital
sentencing procedures. 28 The Court invoked this need for reliability
928 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) ("Sentencing decisions rest on far-reaching inquiry into countless facts
and circumstances ....").
This trend toward subjectivity, however, is not without its critics. Justice Rehnquist,
despite the comment in Stephens quoted above, predicted in his opinion in Lockett that
consideration of unlimited mitigating factors "will not eliminate arbitrariness or freak-
ishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it. [Such con-
sideration] will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it." 438 U.S. at
631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall ex-
pressed similar concerns in Barclay about the failure to limit the aggravating circum-
stances which may be considered. 463 U.S. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("fairness
and consistency cannot be achieved if nonstatutory aggravating circumstances are ran-
domly introduced into the balance."). Moreover, several empirical studies suggest that
the concerns ofJustices Rehnquist and Marshall are well-founded. See, e.g., Bower, The
Pervasive of Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 74J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1067 (1983). See also Riedel, Discrimination in the Imposition of the Death
Penalty: A Comparison of the Characteristics of Offenders Sentenced Pre-Furman and Post-Furman,
49 TEMP. L.Q. 261 (1976).
23 438 U.S. at 620 (Marshall, J., concurring).
24 Id.
25 Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976).
26 See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 ("There is no perfect procedure for deciding in which
cases governmental authority should be used to impose death.").
27 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
28 See, e.g., Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305. Similar views were expressed in Gardner v.
Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (decision to impose death must be, and appear to be,
"based on reason rather than caprice or emotion"), Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-18
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure
that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded the process that will guarantee, as
much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion,
prejudice or mistake"), and Stephens, 462 U.S. at 885 ("although not every imperfection
in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court
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in vacating a death penalty that had been imposed, in part, on the
basis of a confidential presentencing report.29 The Court also va-
cated a death sentence imposed on the basis of unconstitutionally
vague statutory aggravating circumstances.3 0 Thus, it appears that
the Court will tolerate little risk that a death sentence was imposed
by a court in "an arbitrary and capricious manner." Accordingly, all
but the most harmless procedural errors justify the Court in vacat-
ing the sentence. In Zant v. Stephens, for example, one of the statu-
tory aggravating circumstances on which the jury was instructed was
later invalidated by the state supreme court.3 1 The jury, however,
found two separate aggravating circumstances, and the jury could
legitimately have considered evidence of the invalidated factor as a
nonstatutory factor.3 2 The Court thus found the error to be
inconsequential.
33
II. THE FACTS OF CALDWELL V MISSISSIPPI
Bobby Caldwell was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death for shooting and killing the owner of a small grocery store
while robbing it.34 Caldwell's lawyers asked the jury to show mercy,
presenting as mitigating evidence character references, and evi-
judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any
colorable claim of error.").
29 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring).
30 Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (statute allowed jury to find, as an aggravating cir-
cumstance, that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman").
In Stephens, the Court noted that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow
the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposi-
tion of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of
murder." 462 U.S. at 877.
31 Stephens, 462 U.S. at 864.
32 Id. at 887.
33 Id. at 888-89. Even this level of risk, however, was unacceptable to Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan. See id. at 912-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983), provides another example of the risk of unreliability the Court is willing
to take in capital sentencing procedures. In Barefoot, the Court held that the require-
ment that a court of appeals issue a stay of execution if it is unable to resolve the merits
of an appeal prior to the scheduled execution date does not prevent the courts from
adopting "appropriate summary procedures." Id. at 888-89. Here again, the risk of
unreliability actually assumed by the Court was quite low, as the defendant had been
afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits of his appeal, albeit at a pro-
ceeding that combined consideration of the appeal with that of the application for a stay.
See id. at 889-90. Nonetheless, in Barefoot, four of the justices deemed the risk unaccept-
able. See id at 906 (Stevens, J., concurring) (court of appeals made serious procedural
error); id. at 913 (Marshall, J, dissenting) ("there is absolutely no justification for pro-
viding fewer procedural protections solely because a man's life is at stake."); id. at 916
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
34 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 2637 (1985).
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dence of Caldwell's youth, family background and poverty. 35 They
attempted to impress upon the jury the gravity of its decision, sug-
gesting that Caldwell's life rested in its hands.
3 6
The prosecutor, in response, characterized the defense's ap-
proach as unfair, stating, "they would have you believe that you're
going to kill this man and.., they know that your decision is not the
final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is
reviewable."
37
Over objection by defense counsel, the trial judge allowed the
prosecutor to continue, noting, "I think it proper that the jury real-
izes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty com-
mands. I think that information is now needed by the Jury so they
will not be confused." 38
The prosecutor then proceeded to complain that the defense
had insinuated "that your [the jury's] decision is the final decision
• . .and that is terribly, terribly unfair. For . . .the decision you
render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court."39 He
then went on to present his view of the jury's proper role:40 "you
must decide the facts. That's yourjob. Not mine, not theirs, not the
Judge's, not any body's-yours. You decide what those facts are....
[Y]ou take the rules of law ... and you apply them, and you render a
fair and impartial trial without passion, without prejudice, without
sympathy." 4 1 Finally, after recounting some of the recent history of
capital punishment, the prosecutor concluded,
"our Mississippi legislature ... said before the death penalty is arbi-
trarily automatically imposed, the jury . . . the heart of the system, must
determine... that the aggravating circumstances, those which tend to say that the
death penalty is justified must outweigh the mitigating circumstances ... . So





38 Id. at 2638.
39 Id.
40 The comments of the prosecutor regarding the jury's role are omitted from the
opinion ofJustice Marshall, writing for the majority, but are supplied by Justice Rehn-
quist's dissenting opinion. This omission helped the majority characterize the prosecu-
tor's remarks as having led the jury to believe "that responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with [it] but with the appellate court ......
Id. at 2636. See also id. at 2648-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist accuses
the majority of supplying its own "sweeping" characterization of the prosecutor's re-
marks at several points in its opinion). As will be seen, the additional facts supplied by
Justice Rehnquist cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the majority's characterization.
41 Id. at 2648.
42 Id. (emphasis in original).
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Caldwell argued that the prosecutor's statements, in minimiz-
ing the jury's sense of responsibility, violated the eighth amend-
ment's requirement of reliability in capital sentencing
proceedings. 43 An equally divided Mississippi Supreme Court af-
firmed Caldwell's death sentence.
44
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CALDWELL
After disposing of a jurisdictional argument advanced by the
state,45 the Court in Caldwell found that the prosecutor's argument
undermined the "need for reliability" established by Woodson.
46
The Court also cited its historical recognition that death penalty
cases require a "greater degree of scrutiny" 47 than non-capital
cases. The Court further noted that its decision in Caldwell was not
the first case in which it imposed limits on the imposition of capital
punishment out of "concern that the sentencing process should fa-
cilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing
discretion."
48
The Court identified three specific reasons why it feared sub-
stantial unreliability and bias could exist in cases such as Caldwell's.
First, it suggested that appellate review is an inadequate safeguard.
The Court reasoned that appellate courts are "wholly ill-suited to
evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance" as such
courts are able to consider few of the intangibles which a jury could
take into account in its sentencing deliberations. 49 The Court con-
43 Id. at 2636-37.
44 Caldwell v. State, 443 So.2d 806 (Miss. 1983). The state court read the decision of
the Supreme Court in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983), as leaving the state
"with the prerogative to determine whether juries should be informed of sentencing
alternatives .... Caldwell, 443 So.2d at 813. The court suggested that "[bly the same
reasoning, states may decide whether it is error to mention to jurors the matter of appel-
late review .... Id. The court concluded that no error had occurred at Caldwell's trial
because (1) the prosecutor's remarks were justified in response to defense counsel's
pleas for mercy and his false suggestion that a sentence of life imprisonment would leave
the defendant behind bars for the rest of his life, (2) the comments of the prosecutor and
the trial judge regarding appellate review were both "truthful and accurate" And (3) the
jury's finding of four aggravating circumstances with insufficient mitigating circum-
stances to outweigh them was supported by the evidence. Id. at 814.
45 The state contended that the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court rested on
adequate and independent state grounds: specifically, that Caldwell had not initially
assigned as error the prosecutor's argument. Caldwell, at 105 S. Ct. 2638-39.
46 See id. at 2636-37, 2640 (citing Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305).
47 Id. at 2639 (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983)). See also supra
notes 37-42 and accompanying text.
48 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2639 (citing Eddings, 455 U.S. 104; Lockett, 438 U.S. 586;
Gardner, 430 U.S. 349; Woodson, 428 U.S. 280).
49 Id. at 2640. The Court expressed particular concern about an appellate court's
"inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant," rendering it diffi-
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cluded that "[g]iven these limits, most appellate courts review sen-
tencing determinations with a presumption of correctness." 50
Second, the Court reasoned that an "intolerable danger" ex-
isted that a jury might wish merely to "send a message of extreme
disapproval for the defendant's acts," confident that the death sen-
tence, if appropriate, would be vacated on appeal. 51 Thus, the
Court noted, "[a] defendant might . . .be executed, although no
sentencer had ever made a determination that death was the appro-
priate sentence."
5 2
Finally, the Court suggested that given the difficulty of making a
capital sentencing decision, the jury would be unduly tempted to
delegate its responsibility, and thus vote for death because a death
sentence is automatically reviewable. 53 The Court noted that such a
delegation also could lead to the execution of a defendant without a
determination as to the appropriateness of the death sentence. 54 In
finding an undue bias in favor of death as a result of the prosecu-
tor's arguments, the Court further noted that its conclusions had the
support of most of the state courts that had confronted similar
cases. 55
The state argued that the Court's decision in California v. Ra-
mos 56 stood for the proposition that "each state may decide for itself
the extent to which a capital sentencing jury should know of post-
sentencing proceedings."-5 7  The Court characterized the state's
reading of Ramos as "too broad," and went on to distinguish Ramos,
reasoning that the information presented to the jury by the court in
that case was both accurate and relevant. 58 In the instant case, by
contrast, the Court found that the prosecutor's argument was mis-
leading as to the nature of appellate review and irrelevant to the
cult for such a court to consider the "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming
from the diverse frailties of humankind." Id. (quoting Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).5 0 Id. at 2641. But see infra note 81.
51 Id. (citing Maggio v. Williams, 464 U.S. 46, 54-55 (1983) (Stevens,J., concurring)).
In Williams, however, the prosecutor clearly mischaracterized the scope of appellate re-
view, stating that the state supreme court would "review everything that went on in [the]
trial." 464 U.S. at 54 (Stevens, J., concurring).
52 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2641.
53 Id. at 2641-42.
54 Id. at 2641.
55 Id. at 2642 n.4, n.5. See infra notes 80-88 and accompanying text.
56 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
57 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2642. This argument had been accepted by the state
supreme court. See supra note 44. In Ramos, the Court upheld against constitutional
attack the so-called "Briggs Instruction," in which the jury was informed of the gover-
nor's power to commute a life sentence without possibility of parole. See Ramos, 463
U.S. at 992.




The Court also distinguished Donnelly v. DeChristoforo,60 in which
it had upheld a death sentence despite certain improper remarks
that had been made by the prosecutor. The Court noted that the
trial judge in Donnelly had found the prosecutor's remarks to be im-
proper and had given the jury a strong curative instruction. 61 In
Caldwell, the Court pointed out, the trial judge not only failed to give
such a curative instruction, but openly agreed with the prosecutor's
remarks.62 Moreover, the Donnelly Court had characterized the re-
marks of the prosecutor as "ambiguous," whereas the remarks at
issue in Caldwell were, in the Court's view, "quite focused, unambig-
uous and strong."
63
Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion to empha-
size that, in her view, Ramos would not preclude "the giving of non-
misleading and accurate information regarding the jury's role in the
sentencing scheme ... ,"64 She noted that a state may reasonably
conclude that the reliability of its sentencing procedure would be
enhanced by providing such information, as jurors may harbor mis-
conceptions regarding the nature of review undertaken by appellate
courts.
6 5
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent in which he was joined by Chief
Justice Burger andJustice White, showed a greater tolerance for the
risk of unreliability. Rehnquist wrote that "the Eighth Amendment
is satisfied where the procedures ensure that the sentencer's discre-
tion is 'suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' "66 He went on to dispute
the majority's characterization of the facts, arguing that the prosecu-
tor had not told the jury they were not responsible, but rather had
emphasized the jury's role.67 Justice Rehnquist further contended
that, viewed in their entirety, the prosecutor's remarks had not mis-
characterized the nature of appellate review.68 Finally, Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that the trial proceedings themselves should
have convinced the jurors of the importance of their role, pointing
59 But see infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
60 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
61 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2645.
62 Id.
63 Id. at 2645.
64 Id. at 2646 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
65 Id.
66 Id. at 2649 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874
(1983); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 950 (1983)).
67 Id. at 2649-50.
68 Id. at 2650-51.
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to the attention focused upon them in the charge, the impassioned
plea for mercy from Caldwell's counsel, Caldwell, and Caldwell's
mother, as well as the prosecutor's rebuttal.
69
Justice Rehnquist concluded with an interpretation of Ramos
substantially the same as that of Justice O'Connor. He suggested
that the eighth amendment does not prohibit the provision to a cap-
ital sentencing jury of accurate information regarding appellate re-
view.7 0 He wrote that "there is no constitutional requirement that
all information received by a sentencing jury be relevant." 7'
IV. ANALYSIS
Given the need for reliability in capital sentencing procedures,
a death penalty imposed by a jury that had been led to believe that
ultimate sentencing responsibility belonged to someone else would
be properly vacated by the Court. It is questionable, however,
whether the prosecutor in Caldwell had led the jury to believe that it
did not have the ultimate responsibility for sentencing.
In Cupp v. Naughten, the Court wrote that "a single instruction
to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be re-
viewed in the context of the overall charge."'72 The Court recog-
nized that not only is a jury instruction "but one of many such
instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several
components of the trial . . . . "73 As a prosecutor's argument is
"billed in advance ... as a matter of opinion[,] not of evidence,"
74
this same reasoning would appear to apply at least equally well to a
single remark made by a prosecutor. It is therefore not clear that
the reference by the prosecutor in Caldwell to appellate review cre-
ated a significant risk that the jury's sense of its responsibility was
diminished." 75 Whatever risk may otherwise have existed was re-
duced by the prosecutor's subsequent emphasis on the importance
of the jury in the Mississippi capital sentencing system.76
Nonetheless, the Court's past insistence that every safeguard be
observed 77 to insure reliability in capital sentencing,78 as well as its
69 Id. at 2650.
70 Id. at 2651.
71 Id.
72 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107
(1926)).
73 Id. at 147.
74 Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646 (1974).
75 See Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2650 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
76 See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
77 See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 187.
78 See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
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decisions in Zant v. Stephens79 and Barefoot v. Estelle,80 provides some
support for its decision to vacate Caldwell's sentence.
8 l
The Court's decision in Caldwell is also supported by the deci-
sions of most of the state courts that have addressed the issue of the
propriety of references in a prosecutor's argument to appellate re-
view. All of those courts have recognized that such references pose
the danger of diminishing the jury's sense of its responsibility.
8 2
79 See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
80 463 U.S. 880 (1983); See also supra note 33.
81 Yet the Caldwell decision, illustrating as it does the Court's low tolerance of risk in
capital cases, raises questions as to the costs of a constitutionally permissible capital
sentencing systems. As the Court lowers the level of tolerable risk, particularly since its
guidance on death penalty issues has been somewhat ambiguous, the number of capital
sentences vacated by appellate courts will probably increase. See supra notes 8, 23-24
and accompanying text. Moreover, what empirical evidence exists suggests that courts
are already spending a significant percentage of their time on capital cases. In Florida,
for example, one study concluded that only 51.7% of death sentences imposed were
affirmed by the state supreme court. Radelet & Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and
Death Penalty Appeals, 74J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 919 (1983) (based on sample of
145 cases). Of those cases not affirmed, 25.71% were returned for resentencing, with
31.43%o returned for new trials. Id. Thus, the study found, the Florida Supreme Court
spent thirty-five to forty percent of its working time on death penalty cases alone. Id. at
914.
Several commentators have concluded, as did Professor Bedau, that "the costs of a
criminal justice system in which the death penalty is authorized appear to be considera-
bly greater, given present state and federal laws, than the costs of the same system with-
out the death penalty." Bedau, Bentham's Utilitarian Critique of the Death Penalty, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1033, 1049 (1983). See also Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Pun-
ishment, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 555, 57 1; Nackell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL.
69 (1978). What little empirical evidence exists suggests that the concerns of these
scholars are well founded. In New York, for example, the cost of the trial alone in a
death penalty cases has been found to be $1.4 million. Bedau, supra, at 1049 (citing NEW
YORK STATE DEFENDER'S AsSOCIATION, INC., CAPITAL LOSSES: THE PRICE OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN NEW YORK STATE (1982)). By contrast, the cost of imprisoning an individual
for life is only about $0.6 million. Id.
This growing body of literature has prompted the American Bar Association to es-
tablish a special committee to look into the costs of the death penalty. Cheaper to Kill?
A.B.A. Eyes Death Penalty Cost, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1985) at 17. The committee's chairman,
North Carolina Supreme Court Associate justice James Exum, Jr., observed, "If the sen-
tence is appealed the courts can spend years on the same case, " and added, "the ques-
tion becomes, Are the benefits worth the costs?" Id.
82 See, e.g., State v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019, 1035 (La. 1982) (mention of appellate
review "improperly diminishes the jury's duty and responsibility .... ); People v.John-
son, 284 N.Y. 182, 185 30 N.E.2d 465, 466 (1940) (remarks made it "doubtful whether
the jury could thereafter render a verdict with full appreciation of its responsibility.");
Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla. 124, 139, 79 So. 731, 736 (1918) ("tended to lessen [jury's]
estimate of the weight of their responsibility."); State v. Biggerstaff, 17 Mont. 510, 514,
43 P. 709, 711 (1896) ("statement was calculated to cause the jury to be less careful...
and mindful of their duties .... "). Even those courts that failed to find reversible error
agree that such remarks are improper. See, e.g., State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258, 1270
(La. 1981) ("jury might be induced to disregard its responsibility"); Pilley v. State, 247
Ala. 523, 527, 25 So.2d 57, 60 (1946); People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 641, 14 P.2d
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Although some of the decisions in which state courts vacated
sentences were based in part on the fact that the prosecutor's re-
marks in those cases were inaccurate,8 3 at least one state supreme
court, that of North Carolina, has suggested that remarks concern-
ing appellate review are always improper.8 4 In most of the cases in
which the death sentence was upheld, courts based their failure to
find reversible error on the fact that the trial judge in those cases,
unlike the judge in Caldwell, had given a curative instruction.8 5
Other courts have suggested that the harmful effect of references to
appellate review may be lessened because the availability of review
is "common knowledge," 8 6 or that reversal is not required where
clear evidence of guilt exists.8 7 Finally, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has taken the position that the determination of whether or
not a particular reference to appellate review induced a jury to dis-
regard its responsibility depends on the context in which the re-
marks were made.8 8 Thus, for example, the Louisiana court found
no reversible error where the reference to appellate review had
been "preceeded by an explanation of the narrow circumstances
under which the death penalty [had] been deemed appropriate by
the legislature and the courts [and] [t]he prosecutor [had] stressed
[the procedure the jury was to follow in determining the proper
sentence]."
89
In Caldwell, the majority implicitly rejected the Louisiana facts
and circumstances approach and appeared to adopt the per se rule
espoused by the North Carolina Supreme Court, declaring that the
availability of appellate review to a capital defendant "is wholly irrel-
evant to the determination of the appropriate sentence." 90 Four of
880, 888 (1932); Vaughan v. State, 58 Ark. 353, 368-69, 24 S.W. 885, 889 (1894) (re-
marks "improper and unwarranted").
83 E.g., State v. Robinson, 421 So.2d 229, 233 n.2 (La. 1982); Pait v. State, 112 So.2d
380, 384 (Fla. 1959); Biggerstaff, 17 Mont. at 513, 43 P. at 711.
84 See, e.g., State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 169-70, 48 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1948) ("What
consequences the verdict on the facts may bring to defendant is of no concern to the
jury."). The North Carolina Supreme Court has more recently reaffirmed its position in
State v.Jones, 296 N.C. 495, 501, 251 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1979) ("A reference to appellate
review has no relevance with regard to the jury's task .... ").
85 See, e.g., Moore v. State, 240 Ga. 807, 820, 243 S.E.2d 1, 10 (1978); Pilley, 247 Ala.
at 528, 25 So.2d at 60; Brothers v. State, 236 Ala. 448, 453, 183 So. 433, 436 (1938);
Nolan, 126 Cal. App. at 641-42, 14 P.2d at 888; Vaughan, 58 Ark. at 369, 24 S.W. at 889.
86 See Robinson, 421 So.2d at 234; Vaughan, 58 Ark. at 368-69, 24 S.W. at 889.
87 See People v. Linden, 52 Cal. 2d 1, 338 P.2d 397, 410 (1959), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
849 (1960); People v. Sampsell, 34 Cal.2d 757, 765, 214 P.2d 813, 818, cert. denied, 339
U.S. 990 (1950).
88 Robinson, 421 So.2d at 234.
89 AIonroe, 397 So.2d at 1270.
90 105 S. Ct. at 2643.
1062 [Vol. 76
DEATH PENALTY REVIEWERS
the justices, however, suggested that accurate information regarding
appellate review could be provided to a jury.9 ' Thus, although the
issue is not entirely free from doubt, given the mixed views of the
individual members of the Court, it appears that prosecutors will be
prohibited from making any references to appellate review, no mat-
ter how accurate, in their closing arguments.
If jurors harbor misconceptions as to the nature of appellate
review which could be corrected by providing accurate information
regarding the role of appellate courts, the wisdom of the Court's
apparent per se approach may be questioned. Apparently, no em-
pirical studies have been made regarding the extent to which jurors
are familiar with the appellate review process. Both the majority
opinion in Caldwell, and the concurring opinion of Justice
O'Connor, however, recognize the possibility of juror
misconception.
92
The Caldwell Court did not clearly resolve the issue of whether
or not improper references to appellate review are correctible by a
curative instruction to the jury. As has been indicated, several state
courts have held that, at least in some circumstances, reversible er-
ror may be avoided by a proper instruction from the trial judge.93
The Caldwell Court suggested, in distinguishing Donnelly v. DeChris-
toforo, that it would adopt this position if directly confronted with the
issue. The Court characterized the fact that the judge in Donnelly
had given a curative instruction as the " [m]ost important" distin-
guishing factor between Caldwell and Donnelly.94 Nonetheless, it ap-
pears that the Court will not definitely resolve this issue until it is
squarely presented by another case.
91 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text. See also Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2651
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("the fact that the jury's determination is subject to appellate
review, if not common knowledge, is ... information one would think the jury is entitled
to know.").
92 The majority, in discussing the limits of appellate review, recognized that "jurors
often might not understand" these limits. Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2640. See also id. at
2646 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Jurors may harbor misconceptions about the power
of state appellate courts or, for that matter, this Court to override a jury's sentence of
death."). Justice Rehnquist suggests that the availability of appellate review is "common
knowledge," but makes no mention of the possibility that such knowledge may be incor-
rect. See id. at 2651 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93 See supra note 85. But see State v. Little, 228 N.C. 417, 421, 45 S.E.2d 542, 545
(1947) ("it may be doubted that the harmful effect of the improper remarks could have
been removed from the minds of the jury even by full instructions."). See also Hawley,
229 N.C. at 169, 48 S.E.2d at 35.
94 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. at 2645. Further, it appears certain that the three dissenting
justices would support the proposition that any prejudicial effect of reference to appel-
late review is correctible, as they would have affirmed Caldwell's sentence even in the




The principles announced by the Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi
are amply supported by the Court's historical concern for reliability
in capital sentencing procedures. The Court, however, may not
have properly applied those principles in Caldwell because it is not
clear that the prosecutor in Caldwell led the jury to believe that it did
not have the ultimate responsibility for sentencing. The Court's de-
cision in Caldwell is generally consistent with those of the various
state courts that have confronted the issue. The Court appears to
have gone beyond most of the state courts, however, in suggesting
that even accurate references to appellate review during a capital
sentencing proceeding are improper. The wisdom of the Court's
apparent per se approach may be questioned if jurors harbor mis-
conceptions as to the nature of appellate review. If such misconcep-
tions are not widespread, however, the Court's decision in Caldwell
v. Mississippi should enhance the reliability of capital sentencing de-
terminations by reducing the risk that any reference to appellate re-
view may diminish the jury's sense of responsibility.
MICHAEL L. SCHULTZ
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